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The Sky is FallingThe ALI's Efficient Response to Courts in Crisis?
Our federal and state court systems are very busy.'
Additionally, the number of cases that can be classified as
"complex" is g r o ~ i n g Complex
.~
cases take more judicial time
to resolve than routine cases.3 Many, including the Reporters
of the American Law Institute's Complex Litigation Project,
have looked at these numbers and speculated that changes
must be made, else the court system will grind to a screeching
halt.4 Like Chicken Little they have started screaming "the

1. The national average pending case load per judgeship for July 1990
REFORMACT ADVISORYCOMM.,REPORT
through June 1991 was 422. CIVIL JUSTICE
OF THE UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURTFOR THE DISTRICTOF UTAH 12 (1991).
Despite this fairly hefty caseload, there is little indication statistically that this
case load is overwhelming. The national average from filing to disposition of a
federal case in statistical year 1991 was nine months. Id. a t 14. The pending case
load in Utah per judgeship is 426, id. at 12, with disposition taking an average of
twelve months. Id. at 14. Despite the slightly higher than national average
caseload the "existing ratio of district judges to total cases filed [in Utah] is very
adequate." Id. a t 4.
2. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSISWITH REPORTER'S STUDY 13 (1994) ("The causes
of complex litigation . . . show no sign of diminishing, and the deleterious effects
of these cases are bound to be felt.") [hereinafter COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL];
id. a t 14 (citing DEBORAHR. HENSLERET AL., RtENDS IN TORT LITIGATION:THE
STORY BEHINDTHE STATISTICS8-11 (1987)) (stating that "mass latent injury cases
have the potential for explosive growth" and that the system may well experience
them as an explosion); Kyle Brackin, Comment, Salvaging the Wreckage:
L. & COM.655, 658-59 (1992) ("[A]
Multidistrict Litigation and Aviation, 57 J.
tortfeasor's ability to injure has grown astronomically in terms of the number of
persons affected and the degree of possible harm."). This growth will result in
more large-scale, complex lawsuits.
3. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1073
(3d Cir. 1980) (trial estimated to last a full year); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v.
International Bus. Mach. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 426 (N.D. Cal. 1978), af'd sub
nom. Memorex Corp. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.
1980) (trial lasted five months ending in mistrial after jury deadlocked); United
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1978) (trial lasted
11 months before settlement).
4. See, e.g., COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL,supra note 2, a t 14 (stating that
absent a solution, complex litigation "will bankrupt both the state and federal court
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sky is falling." But complex litigation has been around for a
long time and the courts have continued to f u n ~ t i o nAlthough
.~
we do not need to wait until the sky falls to make the courts
more efficient, neither do we need to react hastily.
Multiparty litigation has existed since the 1100s6 and has
been facilitated in the United States by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure since the 1930s.~However, complex litigation,
as this litigation has come to be known, really only began to
cause judicial and academic consternation and discussion in the
1950s when antitrust litigation b u r g e ~ n e d . ~
Since then,
various solutions to the management problems raised by
litigation in general, and by complex litigation in particular,
have been explored congress ion ally^ judicially," and in academia."
systems") (quoting Judge Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions, Going, Going,
Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 324 (1983)); Brackin, supra note 2, a t 658 (stating that
complex litigation "overwhelm[s] the capacity of the courts to handle their
caseloads adequately or efficiently"); Sherrill P. Hondorf, A Mandate for the
Procedural Management of Mass Exposure Litigation, 16 N . KY. L. REV. 541, 541
(1989) (stating that complex litigation has caused "chaos in the judicial system");
Edward F. Sherman, Restructuring the Trial Process in the Age of Litigation, 63
TEX. L. REV. 721, 722 (1984) (book review) (stating that complex litigation has
"taxed the resources of our judicial system to the breaking point"). But see Edward
Brunet, The Triumph of Eficiency and Discretion over Competing Complex
Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273, 280 (1991) ("The Report's thesis-that the
federal courts are in crisis--employs an incomplete calculus that overstates the
costs to the system by ignoring the benefits of case adjudication.").
5. See Zechariah J. Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1297, 1297 (1932) (discussing the economies of consolidating
"parallel litigations [which] involve one or more common questions of law or fact,
or both"); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL,FROM MEDIEVALGROUP LITIGATION TO THE
MODERNC W S ACTION38 (1987) (discussing the existence of multiparty litigation
as early as 1199).
6. YEAZELL,supra note 5, a t 38.
7. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (class actions); see also id. a t 18 (joinder of claims
and remedies); id. a t 20 (joinder of parties); id. a t 22 (interpleader); id. a t 24
(intervention); id. a t 42(a) (consolidation). All of these rules were adopted in 1937.
8. Linda Mullenix, Problems in Complex Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 213, 215
(1991).
9. See 28 U.S.C. 5 1407 (Supp. V 1993) (governing the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation); Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
$8 101-05, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified a t 28 U.S.C. $4 471-82 (Supp. I1 1990))
(requiring courts to consider the development of special procedures to handle
complex cases); see also Stephen C. Yeazell, The Salience of Salience: A Comment
on Professor Hazard's Authority in the Dock, 69 B.U. L. REV. 481, 485 (1989)
(noting that in other countries, many issues that might produce nonroutine
litigation are handled through the legislative or executive process rather than the
judicial process).
10. Judicially promulgated solutions include Procedure in Antitrust and Other
Protracted Cases (otherwise known a s the Prettyman Report) (adopted by the
Judicial Conference of the United States on Sept. 26, 1951), reprinted in Leon R.
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The American Law Institute's Complex Litigation Project
proposal (the "Proposal") is the latest in a long line of proposed
solutions. This Comment will first look at the Proposal and its
underlying theme of efficiency, and then examine the
relationship between efficiency and justice. This Comment
discusses the basic consolidation criteria of the Proposal as
they are applied to the difficulties caused by complex litigation
in its pretrial, trial, and remedial stages. The author concludes
that the Proposal inadequately treats these different types of
complexities, and that its failure to do so has the potential of
creating more complexity. Lastly, a consolidation mechanism
that takes into account pretrial, trial, and remedial complexity
as well as multiparty, multiforum complexity will be proposed.
11. THE PROPOSAL AND EFFICIENCY
While judicial, congressional, and academic solutions
address the problems of managing complex litigation generally,
the Proposal is concerned with complex litigation in its
multiparty, multiforum f o r d 2 and focuses on consolidating
litigation that involves "one or more common questions of fact"
in a federal or state forum.13 To facilitate these goals, the
Yankwich, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 62-84 (1953); Handbook of
Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960);
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICTLITIGATION (1970); MANUAL FOR
COMPLEXLITIGATION,
THIRD(1995) [hereinafter MCL 3D].
11. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking
PlaintiffAutonomy and the Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT.
L. REV. 809 (1989) (concluding that courts need to use existing mechanisms to
aggressively package like cases); Hondorf, supra note 4; Martin I. Kaminsky,
Proposed Federal Discovery Rules for Complex Civil Litigation, 48 FORDHAM
L. REV.
907 (1980) (suggesting discovery rules especially tailored for the needs of complex
cases); Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed
Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039 (1986); Jack Ratliff, Offensive
Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67 TEX. L. REV. 63 (1988) (discussing the
problems with nonmutual collateral estoppel and advocating class actions as a
better vehicle for resolving duplicative litigation); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth
D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 7 (1986) (suggesting an approach for creating federal subject matter
jurisdiction for multiparty, multiforum litigation); Barry R. Schaller, Managerial
Judging: A Principled Approach to Complex Cases in State Court, 68 CONN.B.J. 77
(1994) (proposing rules which balance the need for judicial economy and the need
for impartiality and protection of due process rights in managing complex cases);
Roger H. Transgrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELLL.
REV. 779 (1985) (discussing current joinder techniques and the overall desirability
of joinder in mass tort cases).
12. COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t 7.
13. See id. 5 3.01 (federal intrasystem consolidation); 5 4.01 (state court
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Proposal seeks to repeal and enact various federal transfer
statutes14 as well as to create a Uniform Complex Litigation
Act and an Interstate Complex Litigation Compact.15
The underlying premise of the Project is that efficiency is
the greatest good? The Proposal argues that the repetitive
litigation that is the hallmark of mass tort and contract
litigation "unduly expends the resources of attorney and client,
burdens already overcrowded dockets, delays recompense for
those in need, results in disparate treatment for persons
harmed by essentially identical or similar conduct, and
contributes to the negative image many people have of the
legal system."17 The Proposal seeks to solve these problems of
repetitive litigation by consolidating cases involving "one or
more common questions of fact"18 in a state or federal court.
The rationale is that resolution of multiparty, multiforum
litigation by one or a few courts is more efficient than allowing
those cases to be resolved separately.
The Project defends its emphasis on efficiency by stating
that a more efficient system can be more fair.lg The Proposal
argues that multiparty, multiforum cases that are not
consolidated are not justly resolved since like parties are
It further argues that failure to
treated di~similarly.~~
consolidate "has contributed to differences in appellate
decisions that permit similarly injured plaintiffs to recover
enormous awards in some jurisdictions, modest awards in
others, and no awards in still others."21 However, justifying
the sweeping changes suggested by the Proposal on the
grounds that greater efficiency will lead to greater justice
contradicts many of the basic policy decisions inherent in the
American justice system.

consolidation); 4 5.01 (federal-state intersystem consolidation).
14. Id. app. a at 437-53.
15. Id. app. b at 455-546.
16. See id. at 7-20 (discussing problems caused by inefficiency).
17. Id. at 7.
18. Id. 4 3.Ol(a)(l).
19. See id. at 19-20.
20. Id. at 7 ("Repeated relitigation of the common issues in a complex case
. . . results in disparate treatment for persons harmed by essentially identical or
similar conduct.").
PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 15 n.8 (citing DEBORAH
21. COMPLEX LITIGATION
R. HENSLERET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF h h S S TOXIC
TORTS 48-49 (1985)).
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First, efficiency is not the model on which our government
is based. We have two separate systems of government at the
state and federal levels. The Project's characterization of
dissimilar awards as unjust fails to take into account the
justice produced by our diverse system of state and federal
laws. Our fragmented system inevitably produces disparate
results for similar
yet the system also checks the
exercise of governmental power and thereby protects individual
rights.23Different results for like parties may thus be a cost of
the greater protection provided by our federalist system. In any
event, the greater efficiency achieved by the Project cannot be
so easily justified by a short-sighted view of justice that fails to
consider the justice produced by our system of dual
government. We have accepted the inefficiency of dual state
and federal systems of government in the hope that this
inefficiency will lead to greater justice.
Second, efficiency is not the primary goal of the federal
government. The federal government is divided into judicial,
legislative, and executive branches. These three branches were
not made coequals for greater efficiency. Three branches of
government were created to ensure to the people their
rights-to ensure a just g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~
Third, even within one branch of government, our objective
is not efficiency. The hallmark of our justice system is the jury
Jury trials are not efficient. They are longer26 and

22. See Brunet, supra note 4, a t 287 ("[Ilf victims of defective products reside
in different states, consistent results are not necessarily desirable."); Russell J.
Weintraub, Methods for Resolving Conflict-ofLaws Problems in Mass Tort
Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 129, 134-35 (advocating methods that allow for
different results in some mass torts because of different domiciles of victims).
NO. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
23. See THE FEDERALIST
1987) ("In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people
is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to
each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security
arises to the rights of the people."); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe constitutionally mandated
balance of power between the states and the Federal Government [is] . . . a
balance designed to protect our fundamental liberties.").
NO. 48 (James Madison).
24. THE FEDERALIST
25. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII; THE FEDERALISTNO. 83, a t 464
(Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("The friends and adversaries of
the plan of the convention . . . concur a t least in the value they set upon the trial
by jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former
regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very
palladium of free government.").
26. See Craig M. Bradley, Reforming the Criminal Trial, 68 IND. L.J. 659
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more expensivez7than bench trials. But we as a society have
decided that jury trials lead to a more just result and are
willing to pay for this inefficiency.
The overriding goal of our government is justice, not
efficiency. This is not to say that efficiency is undesirable. It is
only to emphasize that efficiency must sometimes be sacrificed
to the greater goal of justice. Only when we have satisfied
ourselves that justice will be done should efficiency become a
consideration.
Rules can be adopted to make the state and federal court
systems more efficient without sacrificing justice. The Proposal
notes that the goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
a~tion."'~It goes on to say that "[u]nfortunately, complex
litigation can yield determinations that are slow, enormously
expensive, and potentially unjust ."" These difficulties are
apparently adequate justification for the Project's almost
exclusive focus on the inefficiencies of complex litigation. The
Proposal pays scant attention to how those inefficiencies may
be necessary in reaching a just result. Additionally, as
discussed in the remainder of this paper, the Proposal pays
little attention to the potentially greater inefficiencies created
by its recommendations.

Jay Tidmarsh discusses four procedural features that are
commonly thought to be indicators of complex litigati~n.~'

(1993) (discussing the inefficiencies of time caused by jury trials); Mark S. Brodin,
Accuracy, Eficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process-The Case for the
Fact Verdict, 59 U . Cm. L. REV. 15, 17-18 (1990) (discussing the length of jury
trials and the inability of juries to deal effectively with the increasing length and
complexity of cases).
27. See Brodin, supra note 26, a t 17; Daniel B. Yeager, Categorical and
Individualized Rights-Ordering on Federal Habeas Corpus, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
669, 671 n.15 (1994) ("We need plea bargaining because providing jury trials for all
defendants who wish to contest their guilt is too expensive."). Disturbingly, the
expense of a jury trial was used to justify excluding such a right from the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 462. Senator Mason argued that the right to a jury trial
would cause delay and expense and make it nearly impossible for slave owners to
recover their property. See CONG.GLOBE,31st Cong., 1st Sess. app. 1584 (1850).
28. COMPLEX
LITIGATIONPROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t 16 (citing FED. R. CIV.
P. 1).
29. Id.
30. Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and
the Limits of JucEicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1683 (1992).
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These features are "intractable pretrial proceedings; difficulties
of proof and comprehension at trial; complications in the
implementation or administration of a remedy; or the number
of par tie^."^' The Project focuses on complexity caused by
multiparty, multiforum litigation but fails to adequately
account for the other three types of complexity, thereby
creating further problems. This section discusses each of the
four types of complexity, including how the Proposal affects
those types of complexity and suggesting possible solutions to
the problems created by each type of complexity.

A. Complexity Caused by the Number of Parties
The Proposal ignores many types of complexity2 and focuses on the complexity cause by multiparty, multiforum litigation. The Proposal uses the phrase "complex litigation" to "refern exclusively to multiparty, multiforum litigation [which] is
characterized by related claims dispersed in several forums and
often involving events that occurred over long periods of
time."33 Despite its focus on multiparty, multiforum complexity, the Proposal does not effectively resolve the problems
caused by this type of complexity.
Complex cases caused by multiparty, multiforum litigation
"share two defining characteristics: they all involve the potential for relitigation of identical or nearly identical issues, and
consequently, they involve the enormous expenditure of resource~.''~~
Examples of litigation satisfying these two criteria
can be found in the asbestos litigation,s5 agent orange
l i t i g a t i ~ n ,silicone
~~
implant cases," and cases arising &om
31. Id. a t 1701.
32. The Proposal dismisses other types of complexity by stating that these
types of complexities have been or are being dealt with by other groups. COMPLEX
LITIGATION PROPOSAL,
supra note 2, a t 3-4. The Proposal's explanation for ignoring
other kinds of complexities is disingenuous since others have also suggested solutions to multiparty, multiforum litigation and this fact has not stopped the ALI
from going forward with the Project. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony: The Complex Litigation Project Rests, 54 LA. L. REV. 977, 991-93 (1994).
33. COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL, supra, note 2, a t 7.
34. Id.
35. "[Aln estimated twenty-seven million people . . . were exposed to significant concentrations of asbestos dust." David Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A
Story of Asbestos-Carnage, Cover-up, and Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV.1693, 1693
(1986) (book review). T h e estimated legal bill for all facets of the asbestos litigation easily exceeds a billion dollars." Id. a t 1694.
36. Chief Judge Weinstein and Judge Pratt certified a class of approximately
2.4 million members in the agent orange litigation. COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL,
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any airplane accident.38 These examples all involve multiple
plaintiffs seeking recovery for very similar injuries from relatively few tortfeasors. The defendants are repeatedly asked to
disclose the same information. Courts are repeatedly asked to
decide the same questions of culpability. This repetition is time
Thus, though the questions of law
consuming and e~pensive.~'
and fact may be simple, the large number of people involved
have caused cases of this type to be deemed "complex litigation."
The Proposal purports to resolve the problems caused by
multiparty, multiforum litigation. However, the Project's solution may well create more problems than it resolves. Section
3.01 of the Proposal provides the consolidation criterion. Cases
that can potentially be consolidated are those that "involve one
or more common questions of fact."40This definition is overly
broad, as is easily demonstrated. For example, one author has
questioned whether, under the definition given by the Proposal,
a "medical malpractice case [could] be complex if it arose from
the use of a surgical procedure identical to the surgical procedure involved in unrelated actions against other physic i a n ~ [ . ] 'The
~ ~ commentary to the Proposal rejects such an
outcome by stating that "[tlhe second element of the standard,
requiring a finding that transfer will serve the just, efficient,
and fair resolution of the actions, ensures that there will be
substantial factual overlap . . . ."42 However, consolidation of
cases questioning the efficacy of the surgical procedure would
satisfy the second element of the standard. Consolidation would
be efficient; the question of the efficacy of the procedure would
be resolved in one consolidated action and would thus not be
subject to relitigation. Additionally, consolidation would be

supra note 2, a t 11. This class settled for $180 million in 1984. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 689 F. Supp. 1250, 1252 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
37. As of September 1993, there were between 10,000 and 12,000 breast implant claims pending in United States courts. 19 THE GRAY SHEET(FDC Reports,
Inc.), Sept. 13, 1993, a t 1. Awards in early cases ranged from $1.5 million to $25
million ($20 million in punitive damages). Susan A. Casey, Laying an Old Doctrine
to Rest: Challenging the Wisdom of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 19 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 931, 932 n.4 (1993).
38. "Airlines pay from $3,500 to $17,000 per victim in legal fees." Brackin,
supra note 2, a t 656 n.4.
39. See supra notes 3, 33-37 and accompanying text.
40. COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 2, $ 3.01(a)(l).
41. Tidmarsh, supra note 30, a t 1713.
42. COMPLEX LITIGATIONPROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t 43.
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deemed just and fair since patients subjected to the same surgical procedure would receive the same treatment by the judicial
system. Although it is unlikely that cases involving the same
surgical technique would be consolidated, the Proposal
definitionally would allow such an outcome.
The Project implicitly acknowledges the overbreadth of its
definition by giving the transferee court power to separate
consolidated cases into smaller groups involving common quest i o n ~ For
. ~ ~example, in asbestos litigation a transferee court
could separate into different groups and send to different courts
cases involving lung cancer, mesothelioma, asbestosis, and
pleural claims."
Not only does the overbreadth which necessitates bifurcation create inefficiency, the bifurcation process itself creates
inefficiency. Bifurcation is expensive and time c~nsuming.~'
Additional inefficiency is created if the transferee court transfers all of the bifurcated cases back to itself for the determination of an issue such as damages. The necessity for bihrcation
could be eliminated if the Complex Litigation
(the
"Panel"), instead of consolidating all asbestos cases and transferring them all to one judge, sent all asbestosis claims to one
judge and all mesothelioma cases to another judge from the
outset. Time savings would be greater even if all the cases
were subsequently transferred to one judge for the resolution of
damages claims.
Section 3.01 is an attempt to resolve the problem of multiparty, multiforum litigation by consolidating cases involving
"one or more common questions of fact."47As has been shown,
this standard is overly broad and can potentially cause even
greater inefficiency than the unconsolidated resolution of casA better solution might be to allow consolidation only if
e~.'~
43. Id. 5 3.06.
44. See Linda S . Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in
Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 569 (1991) (discussing
the trial approach of Judge Parker in the Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc. litigation, No. B-86-0456-CA (E.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1990)).
45. See MCL 3D, supra note 10, 5 21.632 (noting the possibility of "increased
A. WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R.
cost . . . and inconvenience" with bifurcation); 9 CHARLES
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5 2388 (1971) (describing risks and
benefits of bifurcation).
46. The Complex Litigation Panel is comprised of federal judges who decide
whether to consolidate multiparty, multiforum cases and where to transfer those
cases. See COMPLEX LITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 5 3.02.
47. Id. 5 3.01(a)(l).
48. Tidmarsh, supra note 30, at 1714 ("The huge cases created by assembling
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the common questions of fact arise fkom the conduct of one or
more common parties. Additionally, greater efficiency can be
attained within the proposed system if the Complex Litigation
Panel consolidates groups of like cases rather then sending all
cases to a transferee court from which groups of like cases are
separated and transferred.

B. Complexity in Pretrial Proceedings
Complexity in pretrial proceedings is a result of lengthy
andlor voluminous discovery.4gDifficult legal or factual issues
are not enough to make a case complex a t the pretrial stage.
Lawyers are trained to resolve difficult legal or factual issues.
However, "'voluminous' or 'protracted' discovery . . . precludes
the lawyers from performing their adversarial task-the crafting of persuasive and comprehensive argument^."^^
Case management is crucial to resolving pretrial complexity. As observed by James Withrow and Richard Larm:
[Tlhe crux of truly fair and efficient management of large
cases is still '"ion-hearted" control by the judge. . . . [Llarge
antitrust litigations would be better controlled and certainly
more fairly adjudicated if it were frankly recognized that
pretrial, and not trial, is where the merits of such cases are
revealed. Trial, if it occurs at all, is but the final denouement
of pretrial adjudication, save in the case where pretrial responsibilities have been neglected by the presiding judge."

Failure to manage pretrial discovery in large cases leads to
chaotic and expensive discovery and to complexity during the
trial. "One of the primary objectives in managing complex cases
is the development of procedures to clarify and narrow the
issues in disp~te."'~
Section 3.01 of the Proposal which articulates the factors to
be taken into account prior to consolidation does not list pretriall the parties in one forum . . . might generate the pretrial, trial, and remedial
difficulties oRen associated with multiparty suits.").
ON PLEADINGAND
49. DAVIDW. LOUISELLET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
PROCEDURE
1223 (6th ed. 1989) ("Complex cases can be identified by the fact that
they involve large stakes, broad-ranging discovery, and sometimes multiple parties.").
50. Tidmarsh, supra note 30, at 1703.
51. James R. Withrow & Richard P. Larm, The "Big"Antitrust Case: 25 Years
of Sisyphean Labor, 62 CORNELLL. REV. 1, 5 (1976).
52. Andrew J. Simons, The Manual for Complex Litigation- More Rules or
Mere Recommendations?, 62 ST. JOHN'SL. REV. 493, 503 (1988).

THE SKY IS FALLING
a1 complexity as a factor. Consideration of pretrial complexity
may be implicitly found in the requirement that "transfer and
consolidation . . . promote the just, efficient, and fair conduct of
the actions."53 However, consideration of pretrial complexity
should be an articulated factor of consideration for a number of
reasons. First, the mass consolidation of multiparty,
multiforum cases has the potential to create pretrial complexity
that would not have been present in individually pursued cases. Pretrial complexity can lead to sloppy formulation of the
issues. Sloppy issue-formulation may in turn lead to sloppy
trial presentation54 and a potentially unjust resolution. Second, pretrial complexity may lead to a prolonged period of discovery, thereby unduly postponing recovery. And, as the Proposal points out, "someone who is not wealthy and [is] seriously
injured may find that justice delayed is, indeed, justice denied."55Third, mass consolidation may lead to unexpected conflicts of interest, depriving parties of counsel they would otherwise have been able to rely on.56 Finally, pretrial complexity
and confusion of the issues intensified by consolidation may
deter settlement. "The process of reaching a settlement requires each side to evaluate the risks and opportunities inherent in continuing the litigation and balance them against the
gains and costs of settling a t a particular price."57 If the parties are unable to evaluate these risks accurately, the chances
of settlement are harmed. Settlement, particularly of a complex
case, is far more efficient than taking a case to trial.
In considering consolidation, the Complex Litigation Panel
should evaluate the extent to which pretrial complexities can
For example, different methods of alternative
be res~lved.'~
dispute resolution might be used to resolve little-disputed fac53. COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL,supra note 2, § 3.01(a)(2).
54. See Tidmarsh, supra note 30, a t 1703.
55. COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t 16.
56. See MCL 3 9 supra note 10, § 20.23 (advising the initial investigation of
any possible conflicts of interests caused by consolidation).
MANAGING ANI"l'UST AND OTHER COMPLEX LITI57. WILLLAMW. SCHWARZER,
GATION 193 (1982).
58. See, e.g. WAYNED. BRAZILET AL., MANAGING
COMPI;EXLITIGATION:A
PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS(1983); PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, THE COORDINATION
AND MANAGEMENT OF MAJOR LITIGATION(1982); TORT &
INSURANCEPRACTICESECTION, AMERICANBAR ASSOCIATION,
MANAGINGCOMPLEX
LITIGATION (1991); MCL 3D, supra note 10, Recommendations on Major Issues
REFORM ACT ADVISORYCOMM.,
Affecting Complex Litigation (1981); CIVIL JUSTICE
supra note 1; SCHWARZER,
supra note 57; Dennis A. Kendig, Procedures for Management of Non-Routine Cases, 3 HOFSTRAL. REV. 701 (1975).
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tual questions, eliminating the need for voluminous document
production on those points. Additionally, a special master or
magistrate judge could be appointed to coordinate and facilitate
pretrial discovery and issue for~nulation.~~
The extent to which pretrial complexities can be resolved
may depend in large part on the ability or inclination of the
transferee court to be actively involved in pretrial management. Thus, once the decision to consolidate has been made,
the Panel should take into account the managerial style of the
transferee judge when assigning the case." The Panel should
also consider whether the assignee court has promulgated a
Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan as required by
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990~'and what the Plan provides for in terms of case management.62 Finally, the Panel
should consider the extent to which the court has opted out of
the new discovery rules adopted by the Judicial Conference in
~
that have a functioning Civil Justice
December 1 9 9 3 . ~Courts
Reform Act Plan and that have adopted the new discovery
rules are more likely to have the tools necessary to facilitate
efficient discovery and pretrial planning in a consolidated case.
C. Complexity During Trial
Complexity during the trial can be a product of "large
amounts of evidence in a constrained, pressure-filled situat i ~ n , or
" ~the
~ inability of a decision maker to make a rational
59. See BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 58. "A special master is a private attorney,
a law professor, or a retired judge who is appointed, with or without the consent
of the parties, to assist the judge in performing some of his or her functions." Id.
a t 1 n.2; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (authorization for appointment of special masters); 28 U.S.C. $$ 631-36 (1988) (statutory authorization of magistrates); Peter G.
McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 380
(1979) (stating that the Federal Magistrate Act "provides the federal trial courts
with a long-range, standby resource which can supplement the judges in efficient
and expeditious disposition of the business of the courts").
60. Mullenix, supra note 44, a t 486 ("Judge [Robert M.1 Parker [of Cimino v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., No. B-86-0456-CA (E.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1990)l assumed the
role of a highly activist, managerial judge, whereas Judge [James McGirrl Kelly
[writing in In re Asbestos School Litig., 768 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. Pa. 1991)l assumed
a reactive, non-interventionist posture." Note that Judge Parker's case came to trial
much sooner than Judge Kelly's case. Mullenix, supra, note 44, a t 486.).
61. $5 101-05, 104 Stat. 5089.
REFORMACT ADVISORYCOMM.,supra note 1, a t
62. See, e.g., CIVIL JUSTICE
58-70.
63. See Robert Pass, Big Changes in the Federal Rules, 20 LITIG., Summer
1994, a t 10-11.
64. Tidmarsh, supra note 30, a t 1704.
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decision based on the evidence presented. The first aspect of
trial complexity may create or contribute to the second aspect
of trial complexity. Once again, the Proposal fails to discuss the
problem of trial complexity. Presumably, the requirement that
consolidation "promote the just, efficient, and fair conduct of
the actions" allows consideration of trial complexity prior to
consolidation. However, as in the case of pretrial complexity,
failure to specifically take trial complexity into account prior to
consolidation may create more inefficiency than it resolves.
Trial complexity, due to the volume of evidence, can be
resolved in many of the same ways that pretrial complexity is
resolved.65 For example, special masters may be used in the
pretrial stages to resolve evidentiary disputes,66thus facilitating the admission of evidence. Trial bifurcation can reduce the
volume of evidence to be managed in each trial. Computer
programs can be enlisted to organize and present evidence.
The greatest hazard posed by the presentation of voluminous amounts of evidence is that it contributes to fact finder
dysfunction.67Many solutions have been proposed to the problem of decision makers' incomprehension, and in particular jury
incomprehension. Better management and presentation of evidence, as mentioned above, may ease the situation. Judicial
interrogation of witnesses may help both jury and judicial comprehension of issues by removing the gloss added by counsel.
"[A] number of [other] procedures for improving jury comprehension in complex multiparty civil litigation [can be used],
such as bifurcated trials, preliminary and interim jury instructions, interim summations, juror note-taking and questions,
detailed jury instructions, and special verdicts."68
More radical solutions to the problem of jury comprehension include trying complex cases before special "blue ribbon"
juries composed of experts in the subject matter of the dis-

65. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
ET AL., supra note 58, at 12.
66. See BRAZIL
67. See Brunet, supra note 4, at 278-79; Tidmarsh, supra note 30, at 1766.
68. Mullenix, supra note 44, at 566; see also Committee on Fed. Courts of the
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Improving Jury Comprehension in Complex Civil Litigation,
62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 549 (1988) (focusing on the relationship between judge and
jury while analyzing various techniques which may be employed to aid the jury in
fulfilling its role); Elizabeth A. Faulkner, Note, Using the Special Verdict to Manage Complex Cases and Avoid Compromise Verdicts, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 297, 325
(1989) ("The special verdict allows the trial judge to control the jury, simplify jury
instructions, and place the jury findings on the record for appellate review, thus
reducing unnecessary trials.").
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p~te,~
or' eliminating the jury altogether and appointing judges expert in the area to hear the cases.70The constitutionality
of eliminating a jury trial altogether in complex cases has been
q~estioned.~'However, Justice Marshall in Peters v. ~ i f P ~
acknowledged a due process right to a competent tribunal, stating,
The due process right to a competent and impartial tribunal
is quite separate from the right to any particular form of
proceeding. . . . Long before this Court held that the Constitution imposes the requirement of jury trial on the States, it
was well established that the Due Process Clause protects a
defendant from jurors who are actually incapable of rendering
an impartial verdict, based on the evidence and the law.73

The Third Circuit has found that when the complexity of the
evidence prevents a jury from coming to a rational verdict
there is no right to a jury trial.74 However, the Ninth Circuit
has rejected such a notion stating that the Seventh Amendment does not contain an exception for complex cases.75The
Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue, and
until it does the remaining circuits are sitting on the fence.76
69. See William V. Luneburg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified
Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities
of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L, REV. 887 (1981).
70. Paul Lansing & Nina Miley, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Commercial Litigation: A Comparative Law Perspective, 14 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 121, 135-37 (1991) (discussing a Pennsylvania proposal to create a commercial
court to try certain disputes without a jury before a specially trained business law
judge).
71. Patrick Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment: A Commentary on the Zenith Case, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1571 (1983); Lansing & Miley, supra note 70; Richard 0.Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush
to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68 (1981).
72. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
73. Id. at 501.
74. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084-86 (3d
Cir. 1980).
75. I n re United States Fin. Secs. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977)' rev'd,
609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980) (The district court
refused jury demands on the ground that the case was too complex. The Ninth
Circuit reversed on the ground that there is no complexity element to the Seventh
Amendment.).
76. See Soderbeck v. Burnett County, 752 F.2d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 1985) ('We
need take no position here [as to the theory] that trial by jury violates due process
of law if the suit 'is too complex for a jury to understand and decide rationally'.");
Phillips v. Kaplus, 764 F.2d 807, 814 (11th Cir. 1985) ('While at least one circuit
has suggested that mere complexity of facts alone can provide the basis for . . .
the denial of a jury trial, we have not done so, and we do not do so here" (cita-
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The Panel should consider whether consolidation will exacerbate the problems caused by trial complexity. Prior to transfer of a consolidated action, the Panel should consider whether
the transferee court allows the creation of special juries or the
elimination of a jury altogether. However, the Panel should
also consider that the elimination of a jury trial due to complexity, artificially created by the consolidation of numerous
cases, raises even greater questions of constitutionality than
the elimination of a jury trial in inherently complex cases.
Additionally, transfer to a court that will remove a complex
case from the jury, when the case was originally filed in a court
which will not allow the elimination of a jury trial due to complexity, undermines party expectations. This problem is also
likely to undermine party satisfaction with the resolution of the
case. Party dissatisfaction similarly may arise from the fourth
and final type of complexity, complexity in the implementation
of the remedy.

D. Complexity in the Remedy
Remedial complexity is caused by the creation and attempted implementation of administratively unmanageable
remedies.?? A result of remedial complexity is the inability of
the parties "to implement the declared remedy."?' "[TIhe remedial phase in complex cases often lasts far longer, and is far
more costly in terms of judicial and attorney resources, than
the high-profile pre-remedial phase."7gSince victory without a
workable remedy is hollow,g0 any proposed solution to the
problem of complex litigation that does not discuss remedial
complexity is illusory. The Proposal notes that there are "cer-

tions omitted).).
77. Tidmarsh, supra note 30, a t 1709. Remedial complexity generally manifests itself in two forms: the complexity caused by the "inordinate expense in obtaining and managing the information needed to choose a proper remedy, or the
necessity of solomonic, creative, and somewhat unprincipled solutions to intractable
remedial questions," and the complexity of administering the remedy once it is
fashioned. Id.
78. Id. a t 1773.
79. Id. a t 1709; see also Peter H . Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling
Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U . C H I . L. REV. 337, 338 n.7 (1986)
(stating that in a complex case, "any judgment or settlement reached, even one for
money damages, is likely to be difficult to implement").
80. Tidrnarsh, supm note 30, a t 1774 ("If the rational application of fact to
law dictates in theory a result impossible to accomplish in practice, the legal declaration is a nullity.").
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tain 'complex' forms of relief"" but does not go beyond this
rather terse statement to propose solutions to the problem of
remedial complexity. Neither does the Project acknowledge that
by consolidating multiparty, multiforum cases the Proposal
itself may be creating cases the resolution of which will require
"certain 'complex' forms of relief."
Remedial complexity can result in failure to implement the
declared remedy when one or more of the following problems is
present: first, if there are too many parties to the remedy resulting in administrative chaos (administrative remedial complexity); second, if there are not enough parties to the remedy,
resulting in a party vital to the implementation of the remedy
being outside the court's control (absentee remedial complexity); or third, if implementation of the remedy is so expensive
that the parties, though they may be willing, are unable to
implement the solution (implementation remedial complexity).

1. Administrative remedial complexity
Remedial complexity that is a result of administrative
difficulties caused by the presence of too many parties has been
resolved in a number of ways. Courts have created claims-resolution facilities in a number of mass tort situation^.^^ The
court, in In re Joint Eastern & Southern Districts Asbestos
Litigation, created the Manville Personal Injury Settlement
Trust.83 In the Agent Orange litigation, the court established
guidelines that claimants had to meet in order to claim compensation from the court established fund." These claims resolution facilities reduce administrative complexity by creating a
central facility to which claimants present their claims, establishing uniform standards for claim relief, and subjecting the
remedial process to judicial review. A less elaborate approach
to resolving administrative remedial complexity would be to

81. COMPLEX LITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 2, at 3.
82. Symposium, Claims Resolution Facilities and the Mass Settlement of Mass
PROBS.1 (1990) (describing operation of claim-resoluTorts, 53 LAW & CONTEMP.
tion facilities in asbestos, Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, and Triana cases).
83. See 129 B.R. 710, 751-56, 838-46 (E.& S.D.N.Y. 1991).
84. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 689 F. Supp. 1250,
1263-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 681 F.2d 1259,
1266 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1247 (1984); see generally, Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1516-36 (1976) (discussing calculation and distribution of damages in class actions).
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appoint masters, magistrates, and implementation committees
to create remedial plans and give recommendation^.^^
2. Absentee remedial complexity

The Project recognizes the problems that arise when parties necessary to a solution are not present before the court.
Section 5.05 of the Proposal provides for forced intervention by,
or the preclusion of, claims by nonparties that have claims
involving "one or more questions of fact in common with the
actions pending before the . . . court."86 Section 5.05 resolves
one prong of the "not enough people" problem-it binds all
similarly situated plaintiffs by the court's decision. However, it
does not necessarily allow the court to join defendants necessary to the implementation of the remedy.
Additionally, this expanded notion of issue and claim preclusion seems manifestly unfair. Mandatory intervention forces
individuals to abdicate their own choice of forum and to participate in litigation that involves so many parties and so much
procedure that the psychological and actual value of having
one's case heard "may be lost or triviali~ed."~'Mandatory intervention results in a loss of dignity for the party.88 A "Rand
85. See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 620 F.2d 1143, 1156-58 (6th Cir.) (requiring
experts who are employed to assist the court in creating a remedial plan to prepare written reports to be placed in the record), cert. denied, 449 US. 870 (1980);
Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972) (adopting special master's
recommendations for changes in prison routine); Mullenix, supra note 44, a t 54550, 558-64 (describing use of a court-appointed expert in a group trial to determine
damages in an asbestos class).
86. COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 2, 4 5.05(a)(l).
87. Brunet, supra note 4, a t 297. The Proposal mentions that repetitive litigation may undermine the legitimacy of the courts, COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL,
supra note 2, a t 7, but fails to recognize that an important part of fairness is the
ability to be heard. Consolidation that devalues a party's ability to be heard may
encounter constitutional problems, for, as the Court in Grannis v. Ordean stated,
"The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard."
234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). See also Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation", 54
LAW & CONTEMP.PROBS., Summer 1991, a t 5, 65. Additionally, "aggregation may
dim our capacity to see injustice." Id. An example of this principle in action is the
Agent Orange class consolidation. The concern in creating a class 2.4 million persons strong appears to be less with addressing the injustices suffered by the victims than with just getting the cases out of the courts. See also Roger H.
Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 69
(stating that individuals examining the aggregation of mass torts have given
"[ilnsufficient attention . . . [to] the fairness of such proceedings to individual
plaintiffs").
88. Brunet, supra note 4, a t 297; see also Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation a s Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 44 (stating that involuntary
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Institute study comparing client perceptions of litigation, arbitration, and settlement conferences concluded that dignity was
evaluated as especially important to perceived fairness and
litigant satisfaction. Indeed, litigants rated dignity the highest
procedural concern of those values essential to a fair adjudicatory p r o ~ e d u r e . "The
~ ~ Reporters indicate that one of the concerns behind the Project is that "[rlepeated relitigation . . .
contributes to the negative image many people have of the
legal system."g0It seems likely that the mandatory intervention suggested by the Proposal that results in the undignified
treatment of litigants will contribute even more than repeated
relitigation to the "negative image many people have of the
legal system." After all, there is less cause for concern if the
legal system is slow and repetitive but nevertheless functions
properly than if the legal system fails to fulfill its role.
3.

Implementational remedial complexity

The Project does not address remedial complexity caused
when a defendant fails to implement the remedy because of his
or her financial inability to pay the damage award. However,
solutions to this type of remedial complexity can be developed
by considering the problems raised by asbestos, "[tlhe giant of
complex litigati~n."~'It takes little imagination to conclude
that the repeated award of punitive damages helped drive
asbestos manufacturer Johns-Manville into b a n k r ~ p t c y Per.~~
sons claiming asbestos caused illnesses after the JohnsManville bankruptcy have been treated differently than claimants who participated in the bankruptcy pro~eedings.'~Simply
stated, the repeated award of punitive damages contributed to

participation in complex litigation brings with it questions about "kidnapped" participants).
89. Brunet, supra note 4, a t 284 (footnotes omitted) (citing E. ALLENLIND ET
AL., THE PERCEPTIONOF JUSTICE:
TORT LITIGANTS'VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION
AND JUDICIAL
SET~LEMENT
CONFERENCES
62-63 (1989)).
PROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t 7.
90. COMPLEXLITIGATION
91. Id. at 10.
92. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 31 B.R. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also
Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1122 (1983) ("Manville and UNR Industries are the
first such apparently healthy corporations to file chapter eleven petitions in the
face of massive tort claims.").
93. See COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t 12 (discussing
whether a bankruptcy court "can achieve equity between early- and late-filing
claimants").

9971

THE SKY IS FALLING

1015

the bankruptcy of Johns-Manville, which led to the inequitable
treatment of postbankruptcy claimants.
Punitive damage reform has been much discussed." However, disregarding the need or even the desirability of punitive
damages reform, the Proposal's consolidation mechanism could
be used to resolve more efficiently the problems caused by the
repeated award of punitive damages, thus decreasing remedial
complexity caused by inability to pay. The Panel could, instead
of consolidating all asbestos claims, only consolidate the question of punitive damages. The transferee court would determine
the total punitive damage award. This award would be used to
establish a punitive damage award fund. Asbestos claimants
who were awarded punitive damages in separate unconsolidated trials could then apply to the fund for a portion of the previously determined punitive damage award. This solution has the
advantages of giving qualified claimants a piece of the punitive
damage pie and preventing the repeated punishment of a defendant for the same egregious behavior. As shown below, the
consolidation of common questions of punitive damages promotes the Project's goal of efficiency. In short, consolidation of
punitive damage claims alleviates the problem of remedial
complexity, because it reduces the likelihood that the court will
impose damages that are beyond the defendant's ability to pay,
and it puts the onus of collecting the punitive damages award
on the individual plaintiffs rather than requiring the defendant
to contact a multitude of plaintiffs.
The Proposal inadequately addresses the problem of remedial complexity. Prior to consolidation the Panel should consider whether consolidation will create remedial complexity due to
the sheer number of parties involved. Additionally, the Panel
should consider whether the mandatory intervention provision
of section 5.05 will create more problems in terms of litigant
dissatisfaction than it resolves in terms of remedial complexity

94. See, e.g., Jimmie 0.Clements, Jr., Limiting Punitive Damages: A Placebo
for America's Ailing Competitiveness, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 197 (1992); Stephen
Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN.L.
REV. 1 (1990);Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1992);Jonathan Kagan, Comment, Toward a Uniform Application of Punishment: Using the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a Model for Punitive Damage Reform, 40 UCLA
L. REV. 753 (1993);Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The Split Award Statute: A Move Toward Effectuating the True Purpose of Punitive Damages, 28 VAL.U . L. REV. 473
(1993).
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caused by the absence of necessary parties. Finally, the Panel
should consider whether remedial complexity, caused by inability to pay damage awards, can be resolved by consolidating
only the question of damages.

IV. CONCLUSION:
ANOTHERPROPOSAL
Section 3.01 of the Proposal provides the standard for consolidation of multiparty, multiforum cases. This section provides:
(a) Actions commenced in two or more United States District
Courts may be transferred and consolidated if
(1)they involve one or more common questions of fact,
and
(2) transfer and consolidation will promote the just, efficient, and fair conduct of the actions.
(b) Factors to be considered in deciding whether the standard
set forth in subsection (a) is met include
(1) the extent to which transfer and consolidation will
reduce duplicative litigation, the relative costs of individual and consolidated litigation, the likelihood of inconsistent adjudications, and the comparative burdens on
the judiciary, and
(2) whether transfer and consolidation can be accomplished in a way that is fair to the parties and does not
result in undue inconvenience to them and the witness-

As discussed above, these criteria inadequately address the
problems of pretrial, trial, remedial, and multiparty complexity.
Because of these inadequacies, it is likely that consolidation
under these criteria would lead to greater inefficiencies than
would have existed had there been no consolidation. A standard
for consolidation that better addresses the problems of complex
litigation as a whole is presented below.
(a) Actions commenced in two or more United States District
Courts may be transferred and consolidated if:
(1)they involve one or more common questions of fact
arising from the conduct of one or more common parties,
and
(2) transfer and consolidation will promote the just, efficient, and fair conduct of the actions.

95. COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 2, $ 3.01.
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(b) Factors to be considered in deciding whether consolidation
under the standard set forth in subsection (a) is met include
(1)the extent to which transfer and consolidation will increase administrative difficulties of the pretrial, trial,
and remedial phases of the litigation, thus making a just
resolution of the consolidated case less likely, and
(2) whether transfer and consolidation can be accomplished in a way that upholds the dignity of the parties
and does not result in undue inconvenience to them and
the witnesses; and
(3) whether transfer and consolidation will increase the
likelihood that resolution of the case will result in a effective remedy.

The requirement in (a)(l) that the common question of fact
arise from the conduct of one or more common parties prevents
the prospect of the consolidation of cases of victims of the same
surgical technique practiced by different doctors.96 The requirement in (a)(l) also prevents tortfeasors from being
grouped together, and thereby prejudiced by another
tortfeasor's actions, merely for creating the same product regardless of ~ollaboration.~~
Subsection (b)(l) makes it clear that pretrial, trial, and
remedial administrative difficulties caused by consolidation
should be considered prior to consolidation. If consolidation
would lead to administrative difficulties that would jeopardize
the just resolution of the case, then regardless of the inefficiency, consolidation is not justified. Subsection (b)(2) takes into
account a party's reaction to consolidation. The preservation of
a party's dignity is important in ensuring that litigants feel the
legal system has served them well.'' The addition of (b)(3) is
necessary to recognize that consolidation that results in a remedy that can not be implemented is of little value." Remedy
implementation should be considered prior to consolidation.
The primary goal in resolving any case is a just result, not
simply an efficient result. A case should be resolved efficiently
and justly if possible, but the main purpose of our justice sys-

96. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
97. Tortfeasors who may be found liable under theories of market share liability (e.g., asbestos manufacturers) would still be lumped together since the
tortfeasors are common defendants to each case using the market share theory of
recovery.
98. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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tem should be the administration of justice. The ALI proposes
the consolidation of cases involving "one or more common questions of fact." Consolidation under the criteria suggested by the
Proposal could lead to a just and efficient result. However,
because the Project fails to consider any aspects of complex
litigation other than multiparty, multiforum litigation, it is
likely that consolidation will actually lead to greater inefficiencies and greater injustice in many cases. Thus, problems of
pretrial, trial, and remedial complexity need to be considered
as well as problems raised by multiparty, multiforum cases.
Additionally, greater consideration needs to be paid to party
concerns prior to consolidation. Although our courts are busy, it
is premature to say the sky is falling. It is even more premature to assume that we would prefer an efficient result to a just
result in the event that the sky did fall. As James Madison
stated in Federalist No. 51, "[j]ustice is the end of government."lOOWe cannot deviate from that end.
Christine Gail Clark

100. THE FEDERALIST
NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).

